1. What is verified voting?
Any voting system that enables voters to have confidence that their votes are not only recorded but counted as cast.
It can involve independent vote counting of paper ballots in an “all paper” system, or random auditing of paper ballot counts against machine counts, when electronic machines are used.
Verified voting is not possible in an all electronic voting system, such as the “paperless” Direct Record Electronic (DRE) touchscreen machines used in Sarasota County, because there is no voter verified paper ballot (VVPB) to compare to the machine totals.
2. What voting systems are used in Florida?
As of November, 2008, all counties in Florida will be using optical scanners and paper ballots, except for disabled voters, who may continue to use touch screen DREs until 2012. Sarasota County is the only county in Florida that has paper ballots for all voters, including the disabled. (See the interactive map at www.verifiedvoting.org and drill down to the Florida counties.) The AutoMark ballot marker allows disabled voters to use a paper ballot like all other voters.)
3. Which DRE system does Sarasota County use?
"As of November, 2007, Sarasota County now uses paper ballots scanned by the Premier OSX optical scanner, with the GEMS central tabulator, and the AutoMark ballot marker for disabled voters. Prior to 2007, it used the iVotronic DRE paperless touch screen voting machines and the Unity Central tabulator made by ES&S (Election Systems and Software.) With that equipment, all hardware, software and firmware are proprietary to the vendor. All recording, counting and tallying of the votes are done inside the machine. There is no separate record (voter verified paper ballot) to audit machine totals. Therefore, the final results depend entirely on the accuracy and viability of the computer software, firmware and hardware on Election Day. If machines fail or malfunction, no paper ballot exists as a backup to ensure an accurate count. There is only the machine printout, which itself could be faulty."
4. Would a printer attached to the DREs provide the “paper trail” we need?
No: Printers attached to the DREs will not provide an independent record of the vote.
The printer, like the DRE, operates with proprietary, undisclosed software. Just because a vote looks like it is being accurately recorded on the printer, does not mean it is being recorded that way internally in the computer itself. The computer can still print out incorrect totals that do not reflect the voter verified paper records on the printed roll and no one would know--especially with no manual audits as prescribed in current Florida recount provisions.
In addition, currently certified printers are not conducive to auditing because they use a narrow continuous roll of thermal paper, which turns brown if subjected to heat, and fades to illegibility in a short time.
5. Why not just get a “paper receipt” to prove what we voted?
A simple receipt would not provide an audit trail so that elections officials could verify the votes cast
What is required is a permanent paper record of the voter’s wishes, one that can be used to audit and verify the electronic vote. This paper ballot would be the official record of the vote and would stay at the elections office, and be used to audit machine totals, before the results are certified.
6. Do you mean we would go back to punchcards and hanging chads?
No:
Punchcards are banned in Florida. Sarasota Alliance for Fair Elections (SAFE) is not suggesting a return to a failed system. SAFE is, however, suggesting a system in which the vote can be audited and verified--one that is immune to fraud. The proposed verified paper ballot would be similar to the absentee ballot now used in Sarasota County.
7. Wouldn’t optical scanners require a big adjustment for precinct and Elections Office workers?
No.
The Elections office already has two high-speed optical scanners that scan all absentee, military and overseas votes, so elections personnel are familiar with the machines. The scanners we propose are smaller, less expensive, and would be based in the individual precincts. Only one scanner per precinct is needed. The ballots would be similar to absentee ballots in size and shape. See "ELECTIONS", page 9 to see photographs of the two types of optical scanners.
8. Will optical scanners allow us to correct our ballot, if we overvote by mistake?
Yes:
When you vote and scan your ballot at the polling place, the precinct based optical scanner will reject the ballot if you overvote (vote for too many candidates in a race). In that case, you will be able to complete a new ballot.
9. What do other Florida counties use?
Many counties have rejected DREs in favor of optically scanned paper ballots. In fact, over 75% of the counties in Florida (52 out of 67) use optical scanners and paper ballots (similar to the absentee ballot we use now in Sarasota County). As of November, 2008, all 67 counties will use paper ballots and optical scanners.DRE touchh screen machines will only be allowed for use by the disabled, until 2012, except in Sarasota County, where all voters, including the disabled with the aid of the ballot marker AutoMark, have been voting on paper ballots since November, 2007.)"
Optical scanners are easy to use, less expensive to run than DREs, and provide the voter verified paper ballot needed to audit machine totals. Optical scanners were recommended over DREs by the Governor’s Voting System Task Force of 2001. Sarasota County is one of only 15 counties in the state that purchased touchscreen DREs in 2002 and still use them exclusively for Early Voting and all voting at the precincts on Election Day. Our DREs provide no independent record of the vote. Even the federal Government Accountability Office report of September, 2005 concluded that electronic voting machines (when used without paper ballots) cannot be trusted to provide a faithful record of the vote, and may alter election outcomes.
10. Aren’t touchscreen DREs required for the disabled?
No: They are not required.
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) requires voting machines that are accessible to the disabled and allow them to vote independently and privately. Ballot marking devices allow the disabled to vote unassisted and are available at a fraction of the cost of DREs. They include the Automark by ES&S, which is certified in 25 states and works with optical scanners. The Automark has been pending certification in Florida for 11 months. Another ballot marking device other states use is the Vote-PAD.
http://www.essvote.com/HTML/products/automark.html
http://www.vote-pad.us/
11. Aren’t optical scanners hackable?
Yes:
ALL electronic machines are hackable--including optical scanners and DREs. The key difference is that, with optical scanners you have a voter-produced, hand-completed, paper ballot which is not only the true record of the voter’s intent, but can be used to verify the electronic results. This makes it nearly impossible to produce a vote that is not what the voters intended.
12. Has anyone ever hacked a DRE touchscreen system?
Yes:
In 2003, a Diebold touchscreen DRE system was hacked in a test. In 2004, California decertified these machines for a combination of machine problems, errors, and fraud. Although Sarasota County does not use Diebold DREs, it is a concern to SAFE that Florida chose to certify Diebold DREs in 2005, despite mounting problems surrounding Diebold (see www.votersunite.org/info/Dieboldinthenews.pdf), and that optical scan counties in Florida have been pressured to purchase either ES&S or Diebold touchscreen DREs despite increasing evidence about security and reliability problems with all DRE technology.
13. Do other states require voter verified paper ballots?
Yes.
31 states have now passed legislation requiring voter verified paper ballots. (See www.verifiedvoting.org for the latest updates.) In 2007, the Florida legislature passed CS/HB537 that provided paper ballots for almost all voters (except the disabled) by the November, 2008 election, but fell short of providing a statistically significant audit of those elections prior to certification. Voters of all political parties should demand that their Florida State Senators and Representatives pass meaningful audit legislation to make sure the electronic central compilers are working correctly on Election Day
14. Aren't we "going backward" to have paper ballots?
No. We are going forward to preserve American democracy.
95% of respondents to a survey of computer professionals conducted by the 81,000 member Association of Computing Machinery support paper ballots and mandatory audits. Due to the risks and vulnerabilities inherent in many voting systems in use today--particularly computer-based electronic voting systems--it is important that physical (paper) records are maintained to ensure that a vote has been cast accurately and to serve as an independent check on the result produced and stored by the system.
http://www.acm.org/usacm/weblog/index.php?p=73
15. Isn't this a criticism of our Supervisor of Elections and her staff?
No.
It is a concern about the equipment we use to vote. No one knew the vulnerability of the DRE touchscreen machines when they were purchased in 2001. Now we know. Our elected officials should make the prudent decision to replace our vulnerable touchscreen DREs with a verifiable system such as optical scanners and voter verified paper ballots to audit machine results. We MUST have these to protect the rights of ALL voters and preserve our American freedom and democracy.
16. What is the cost of optical scanners, and how would we pay for them?
Currently it costs approximately $2,900,000/year to operate our DRE touchscreen equipment in Sarasota County.
Using data from the Supervisor of Elections office, it is estimated that Sarasota County could save approximately 29% over what it spends now to operate touchscreen machines by switching to optical scanners, or over $800,000 per year. In part, this is because only one optical scanner is required per precinct. (See the Myerson cost studies below.)
The cost to replace the county's existing base of DREs with 156 optical scanners would be approximately $1,250,000. The yearly savings of over $800,000 in operating costs means that Sarasota County could pay for the optical scanners in less than two years.
How can we resist the opportunity not only to save the county $800,000 per year but also to insure a valid, auditable vote?
The Myerson Cost Study: comparison of costs of using optical scanners vs. DREs in 33 counties in Florida (this is a PDF file and will require the Adobe Reader ‘free of charge’ at Adobe.)
Rosemarie Myerson Letter to the County Commissioners
Myth Breakers: Facts about Electronic Elections: Essential information for those entrusted with making decisions about election systems in the United States. 2nd edition, 2005 (63 pages)
Voters Unite Website: (www.votersunite.org) contains much valuable information on all voting systems.
"ES&S in the News: A Partial List of Documented Failures", (51 pages) which includes failures both of optical scanners, Direct Record Electronic (DRE) touchscreen voting machines, and the Unity Election Management Software, which runs the central tabulators that compile the totals. Election Systems and Software (ES&S) makes all three types of equipment.
“Winners and Losers of 2003: Worst Technology”. Fortune Magazine; December, 2003: by Peter Lewis http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2003/12/22/356107/index.htm
The GAO (Government Accountability Office) Report to Congressional Requesters of September, 2005, titled "ELECTIONS: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed." (101 pages) This extensive document concludes that touch-screen systems "hold promise" but are not yet secure or reliable. (p 53). It also includes photographs of different equipment such as the precinct based optical scanner and central count optical scanner used to count absentee ballots. (p 9).
Carter/Baker report http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf See the executive summary (at front), and details on p. 27. This report suggests other means for auditing machines in the future, but recommends a paper backup now.
“Trust but verify”
This phrase was made famous by Ronald Reagan regarding Soviet armaments.It is a principle that applies in a multitude of circumstances, including voter confidence in election results.
